Wednesday, July 16, 2014

A really bad decision


[This is dedicated to my unborn grandson, due November 2014.  It’s my way of explaining current developments to him.]

Sometimes governments make really bad decisions.  

I’m not talking about run-of-the-mill bad decisions, which any government might make as part of the complex process of politics and which can be easily reversed by the next government.  I’m talking about monstrously stupid decisions that will be incredibly hard to rectify, yet if left unrectified will be a huge burden for decades.

I’m talking about a decision so bad that our descendants will shake their head in incomprehension, sadness and, yes, anger.  They will ask how we could have been so badly and stupidly governed.

Today, the Australian government repealed its carbon tax legislation.  This tax was paid to the government by major CO2 emitters.  Money received was re-distributed to the electorate to reimburse costs passed on by emitters.  This was done in a reasonably fair way, with people on low incomes receiving preferential reimbursement compared to those on high incomes.

The carbon tax had been in operation in Australia for two years.  It was working [1]; CO2 emissions were falling as gas and renewables replaced coal-fired power generation and industry introduced new processes and saved energy in response to the cost signal.  Yes, there were losers in this process, particularly the coal-fired electricity generators.   But there were big winners too, particularly new industries based on renewable power and energy efficiency.  Jobs might have been lost because of the carbon tax, but jobs were created too.

It needs to be stated clearly why the carbon tax is a good thing.  Today there is a 97% consensus [2] among climate scientists that CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are changing the Earth’s climate.  The change will be slow at first and there are still many doubters and deniers, but the effects are cumulative and irreversible on the timescales of millenia.  In the worst-case scenarios air temperatures will rise 4°C by the end of this century.  The polar ice caps and glaciers will melt and the sea level will rise, thereby imperilling infrastructure and threatening the entire livelihood of those in countries like Bangladesh who live close to sea level.  More extreme weather events are expected, biodiversity will be affected, the oceans will become more acidic, and there will be adverse effects on human health.[3]

Every credible expert I’ve read says that it would be far better for humankind to act now to avoid problems caused by CO2 emissions, rather than to act in response once effects have occurred.

Meanwhile, the low-carbon future should also be viewed as a huge economic opportunity.  There are immensely powerful global drivers at work:

  • Decarbonisation of supply.  This is the switch towards solar and wind for electricity generation, and the introduction of new industrial processes that reduce CO2 emissions and save energy.
  • Pollution reduction.  Coal doesn’t only involve CO2 pollution, it causes many other problems as well [4].
  • Energy security.  Every country in the world wants an assured energy supply, not something that can be turned off at the whim of an autocratic regime elsewhere.
  • New-build infrastructure.  Just in case we forget, there are billions of people on this planet still without an electricity grid.  These citizens want the convenience of electrical power, and renewables will offer the easiest way for them to get it.
  • Manufacturing policy.  Some countries see the low-carbon future as an opportunity to strengthen their industrial base.  They will put in place initiatives to promote the interests of their own economies, including R&D incentives and government programs.

Our government is blind to these drivers.

And here is my special message to deniers who don’t accept the science of climate change.  The trend is not your friend.  Pioneers and early adopters are re-shaping the economic landscape across the world, and they will be rewarded for their foresight as the effects of climate change become more evident.  In contrast, those who seek to preserve the status quo – our local fossil-powered dinosaurs – will be left with stranded assets and a huge task to fix the mess that has been caused.

So even if you deny anthropogenic climate change, influential people in the rest of the world disagree with you, and they are today making cool-headed decisions in boardrooms in countries like Germany and China that will affect you tomorrow.  

Our fossil fuel reserves are undeniably finite, so we have to move to a clean energy infrastructure eventually.  But we now know that our fossil fuel gift from nature comes at a terrible price.  If we burn all the fossil fuels we will be hot, flooded, traumatised by weather, threatened by disease and morally weakened by the changes we have wrought to our planet.  We are literally threatening the prospects for human life.

There is a clear path forward that involves collaboration and good governance to move us to a low carbon and then zero carbon future.  It’s not even a difficult path, because it offers a cleaner and more comfortable environment, without economic disadvantage, as well as jobs in sunrise industries and better stewardship of our resources.  If costs to rectify the damage caused by global warming are taken into account, the low-carbon path actually involves lower costs than the present trajectory [5].

But the low-carbon path is challenged by those who want to preserve their current position and wealth, generally old men who manipulate the levers of power to their advantage. 

The repeal of Australia’s carbon tax means we lose valuable time to confront the challenges that we will inevitably face.  Apart from the Renewable Energy Target currently under fierce attack by the government, there is no replacement mechanism available in Australia to reduce carbon emissions.  The government’s proposed “Direct Action” scheme is so bad that it’s risible.  So bad, in fact, that it will not get through the upper house of parliament.  And any move towards an emissions trading scheme, offered as a sop by the cross-benchers in the senate as part of the repeal of the carbon tax, will not get through the lower house of parliament in the present government.  Past good work to reduce our CO2 emissions will be wasted, and we will be steered by government decisions into a fossil powered economic dead end, instead of towards the industries of the future.

I fear this decision will take years to unwind.  In its lust for temporary advantage, the Australian government is acting to harm fellow citizens of our world.  It is also reducing Australia’s capability to participate in the inevitable revolutionary development of Earth’s energy infrastructure.

All those who have contributed to this decision should hang their heads in shame. They are going to be very harshly judged by history.  A really bad decision indeed!

Notes

[1] Quarterly Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory: December 2013.  Australian Government, Department of the Environment.  See particularly Figs 6 and 18.


[3] IPCC, 2014: Summary for policymakers. In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Cambridge University Press (2014).

[4] P R Epstein et al., “Full cost accounting for the life cycle of coal”, Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1219 (2011), 73-98.

[5] N Stern, “Stern Review on the economics of climate change”, H.M. Treasury, London (2006).

Wednesday, May 21, 2014

Cost of solar power (44)


RenewEconomy has a story today about a PV installation at Rio Tinto’s bauxite mine at Weipa at the northern tip of Queensland, Australia.  At present, the mine’s electricity is provided by diesel generators, which require the fuel to be shipped in, clearly an expensive process.
 
Replacement of diesel power generation at remote mine-sites is reckoned to be ‘low hanging fruit’ for the solar industry and a number of big players are active in the market.
 
Here are some facts about the Weipa installation, including data kindly made public by ARENA, the Australian Renewable Energy Agency.  Overall the two-stage project will cost AUD 23.4 million, of which ARENA will provide AUD 11.3 million.  In the first stage, 18,000 thin film PV panels from First Solar will generate 1.7 MW peak and 2,620 MWh per year.  ARENA will provide AUD 3.5 million for the first stage, which is due for completion in January 2015.
 
ARENA’s CEO, Ivor Frischknecht, says
 
“This is the first time a mining company has adopted renewable energy for its Australian operations and is the first project to be funded through the Industry arm of ARENA’s Regional Australia’s Renewables Program.”
 
Clearly today’s announcement is a pivotal event for renewable energy in Australia.
 
In the second stage, another 5 MW of capacity will be added, together with an unspecified amount of battery storage.  ARENA will provide an additional AUD 7.8 million for the second stage.
 
I’d really like to make an analysis of both stages, but I don’t have the data on the amount of battery storage.  However I can analyse the LCOE for the first stage once I’ve made one (thoroughly reasonable) assumption about costs, namely that Rio Tinto will provide 50% of the Stage 1 costs.  That gives the Stage 1 cost as AUD 7.0 million for an output of 2,620 MWh per year.
 
We can now proceed to analyse the LCOE using my standard assumptions:
  • there is no inflation,
  • taxation implications are neglected,
  • projects are funded entirely by debt,
  • all projects have the same interest rate (8%) and payback period (25 years), which means that the required rate of capital return is 9.4%,
  • all projects have the same annual maintenance and operating costs (2% of the total project cost), and
  • government subsidies are neglected.

For further commentary on my LCOE methodology, see posts on Real cost of coal-fired power, LEC – the accountant’s view, Cost of solar power (10) and (especially) Yet more on LEC.  Note that I am now using annual maintenance costs of 2% rather than 3% as in posts during 2011.

The results for the Weipa project are as follows:

Cost per peak Watt              AUD 4.1/Wp
LCOE                                     AUD 304/MWh

The components of the LCOE are:

Capital           {0.094 × AUD 7×10^6}/{2,620 MWhr} = AUD 251/MWhr
O&M              {0.020 × AUD 7×10^6}/{2,620 MWhr} = AUD 53/MWhr

By way of comparison, LCOE figures (in appropriate currency per MWh) for all projects I’ve investigated are given below.  The number in brackets is the reference to the blog post, all of which appear in my index of posts with the title “Cost of solar power ([number])”:

(2)        AUD 183 (Nyngan, Australia, PV)
(3)        EUR 503 (Olmedilla, Spain, PV, 2008)
(3)        EUR 188 (Andasol I, Spain, trough, 2009)
(4)        AUD 236 (Greenough, Australia, PV)
(5)        AUD 397 (Solar Oasis, Australia, dish, 2014?)
(6)        USD 163 (Lazio, Italy, PV)
(7)        AUD 271 (Kogan Creek, Australia, CLFR pre-heat, 2012?)
(8)        USD 228 (New Mexico, CdTe thin film PV, 2011)
(9)        EUR 200 (Ibersol, Spain, trough, 2011)
(10)      USD 231 (Ivanpah, California, tower, 2013?)
(11)      CAD 409 (Stardale, Canada, PV, 2012)
(12)      USD 290 (Blythe, California, trough, 2012?)
(13)      AUD 285 (Solar Dawn, Australia, CLFR, 2013?)
(14)      AUD 263 (Moree Solar Farm, Australia, single-axis PV, 2013?)
(15)      EUR 350 (Lieberose, Germany, thin-film PV, 2009)
(16)      EUR 300 (Gemasolar, Spain, tower, 2011)
(17)      EUR 228 (Meuro, Germany, crystalline PV, 2012)
(18)      USD 204 (Crescent Dunes, USA, tower, 2013)
(19)      AUD 316 (University of Queensland, fixed PV, 2011)
(20)      EUR 241 (Ait Baha, Morocco, 1-axis solar thermal, 2012)
(21)      EUR 227 (Shivajinagar Sakri, India, PV, 2012)
(22)      JPY 36,076 (Kagoshima, Kyushu, Japan, PV, start July 2012)
(23)      AUD 249 (NEXTDC, Port Melbourne, PV, Q2 2012)
(24)      USD 319 (Maryland Solar Farm, thin-film PV, Q4 2012)
(25)      EUR 207 (GERO Solarpark, Germany, PV, May 2012)
(26)      AUD 259 (Kamberra Winery, Australia, PV, June 2012)
(27)      EUR 105 (Calera y Chozas, PV, Q4 2012)
(28)      AUD 205 (Nyngan and Broken Hill, thin film PV, end 2014?)
(29)      AUD 342 (City of Sydney, multiple sites, PV, 2012)
(30)      AUD 281 (Uterne, PV, single-axis tracking, 2011)
(31)      JPY 31,448 (Oita, PV?, Japan, to open March 2014)
(32)      USD 342 (Shams, Abu Dhabi, trough, to open early 2013)
(34)      USD 272 (Daggett, California, designed 2010)
(35)      GBP 148 (Wymeswold, UK, PV, March 2013)
(36)      USD 139 (South Georgia, PV, June 2014)
(37)      USD 169 (Antelope Valley, CdTe Pv, end 2015)
(38)      AUD 137 (Mugga Lane, PV, mid 2014)
(39)      AUD 163 (Coree, fixed PV, Feb 2015)
(40)      AUD 298 (Ferngrove Winery, July 2013)
(41)      USD 125 (Cerro Dominador, mid 2017)
(42)      USD 190 (La Paz, PV, September 2013)
(43)      USD 152 (Austin Energy, PV, 2016)
(44)      AUD 304 (Weipa, PV, January 2015)

Conclusion

You can compare results with my LCOE graphic.

The Capacity Factor for Stage 1 of this installation is 2620/(365 × 24 × 1.7) = 0.176.  That’s not brilliant for a tropical location with a daily solar exposure of 21 MJ/m^2, although cloudy days and storms would be expected frequently in summer.  I can only presume the panels are fixed.

I’m underwhelmed with the LCOE of AUD 304 per MWh.  Even allowing for the remote location and high costs to transport workers and material, the LCOE figure seems off the pace compared to recent installations in the list above.

Sunday, May 18, 2014

Cost of solar power (43)


A few days ago, Recurrent Energy issued a press release with some brief details of a 150 MW installation in Austin, Texas.  When I say “brief details”, that’s what I mean.  The only two items of hard information in the document are “completion in 2016”, and the “power to be delivered to Austin Energy pursuant to a 20-year Power Purchase Agreement”.

Elsewhere, greentechmedia reports that the PPA is for less than 5 cents per kWhr.  and several sources including Fuel Fix say that the value of the contract is USD 525 million and the project will occupy 1,000 acres = 405 Ha.  Fuel Fix also says that 1 MW provides enough power for 500 Texas residences under normal conditions.  Meanwhile, this reference says the average electricity consumption in Texas is approximately 14,000 kWh per year.

So we know the cost of the deal, but what about the annual output?  In my analysis of the Antelope Valley installation, I used a figure of 0.30 for the Capacity Factor of a PV system with one-axis tracking.  Let’s use that CF here.  The annual output would then be 150 × 365 × 24 × 0.3 = 394,200 MWh.

Or, if I say that the system will provide power to 150 × 500 Texas residences with an average annual consumption of 14 MWh per year, the annual output would be 150 × 500 × 14 = 1,050,000.

Those two estimates for the annual output are widely disparate.  I think the first estimate is ambitiously high and the second estimate is ridiculously high.  Let’s stick with the first estimate.

We can now proceed to analyse the LCOE using my standard assumptions:
  • there is no inflation,
  • taxation implications are neglected,
  • projects are funded entirely by debt,
  • all projects have the same interest rate (8%) and payback period (25 years), which means that the required rate of capital return is 9.4%,
  • all projects have the same annual maintenance and operating costs (2% of the total project cost), and
  • government subsidies are neglected.
For further commentary on my LCOE methodology, see posts on Real cost of coal-fired power, LEC – the accountant’s view, Cost of solar power (10) and (especially) Yet more on LEC.  Note that I am now using annual maintenance costs of 2% rather than 3% as in posts during 2011.

The results for the Austin Energy project are as follows:

Cost per peak Watt              USD 3.5/Wp
LCOE                                     USD 152/MWh

The components of the LCOE are:
Capital           {0.094 × USD 525×10^6}/{394,200 MWhr} = USD 125/MWhr
O&M              {0.020 × USD 525×10^6}/{394,200 MWhr} = USD 27/MWhr

By way of comparison, LCOE figures (in appropriate currency per MWh) for all projects I’ve investigated are given below.  The number in brackets is the reference to the blog post, all of which appear in my index of posts with the title “Cost of solar power  ([number])”:

(2)        AUD 183 (Nyngan, Australia, PV)
(3)        EUR 503 (Olmedilla, Spain, PV, 2008)
(3)        EUR 188 (Andasol I, Spain, trough, 2009)
(4)        AUD 236 (Greenough, Australia, PV)
(5)        AUD 397 (Solar Oasis, Australia, dish, 2014?)
(6)        USD 163 (Lazio, Italy, PV)
(7)        AUD 271 (Kogan Creek, Australia, CLFR pre-heat, 2012?)
(8)        USD 228 (New Mexico, CdTe thin film PV, 2011)
(9)        EUR 200 (Ibersol, Spain, trough, 2011)
(10)      USD 231 (Ivanpah, California, tower, 2013?)
(11)      CAD 409 (Stardale, Canada, PV, 2012)
(12)      USD 290 (Blythe, California, trough, 2012?)
(13)      AUD 285 (Solar Dawn, Australia, CLFR, 2013?)
(14)      AUD 263 (Moree Solar Farm, Australia, single-axis PV, 2013?)
(15)      EUR 350 (Lieberose, Germany, thin-film PV, 2009)
(16)      EUR 300 (Gemasolar, Spain, tower, 2011)
(17)      EUR 228 (Meuro, Germany, crystalline PV, 2012)
(18)      USD 204 (Crescent Dunes, USA, tower, 2013)
(19)      AUD 316 (University of Queensland, fixed PV, 2011)
(20)      EUR 241 (Ait Baha, Morocco, 1-axis solar thermal, 2012)
(21)      EUR 227 (Shivajinagar Sakri, India, PV, 2012)
(22)      JPY 36,076 (Kagoshima, Kyushu, Japan, PV, start July 2012)
(23)      AUD 249 (NEXTDC, Port Melbourne, PV, Q2 2012)
(24)      USD 319 (Maryland Solar Farm, thin-film PV, Q4 2012)
(25)      EUR 207 (GERO Solarpark, Germany, PV, May 2012)
(26)      AUD 259 (Kamberra Winery, Australia, PV, June 2012)
(27)      EUR 105 (Calera y Chozas, PV, Q4 2012)
(28)      AUD 205 (Nyngan and Broken Hill, thin film PV, end 2014?)
(29)      AUD 342 (City of Sydney, multiple sites, PV, 2012)
(30)      AUD 281 (Uterne, PV, single-axis tracking, 2011)
(31)      JPY 31,448 (Oita, PV?, Japan, to open March 2014)
(32)      USD 342 (Shams, Abu Dhabi, trough, to open early 2013)
(34)      USD 272 (Daggett, California, designed 2010)
(35)      GBP 148 (Wymeswold, UK, PV, March 2013)
(36)      USD 139 (South Georgia, PV, June 2014)
(37)      USD 169 (Antelope Valley, CdTe Pv, end 2015)
(38)      AUD 137 (Mugga Lane, PV, mid 2014)
(39)      AUD 163 (Coree, fixed PV, Feb 2015)
(40)      AUD 298 (Ferngrove Winery, July 2013)
(41)      USD 125 (Cerro Dominador, mid 2017)
(42)      USD 190 (La Paz, PV, September 2013)
(43)      USD 152 (Austin Energy, PV, 2016)

Conclusion

You can compare results with my LCOE graphic.

My analysis for the Austin Energy project has uncertainties in annual output, but I think it’s reasonable to conclude that project is in the same LCOE range as the best of the PV projects I have analysed.  Based on my LCOE methodology, which I use uniformly across all projects, the LCOE is definitely more than 5 US cents per kWh, in fact about three times as much.  The effects of government subsidies are not included in my analysis.

The capital cost for the project is not cheap at USD 3.5/Wp.  That indicates to me they must be using one-axis tracking, although I couldn’t find any confirmation of that on the internet.

Friday, February 28, 2014

LCOE graphic for solar power


In my last post, I promised I’d update my graphic for the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE).  See below (click for a larger image).  Red denotes solar thermal, blue denotes PV.  Open circles denotes projects that have been announced but not completed to my knowledge.  Filled-in circles denote completed projects.

The LCOE is expressed in US dollars at today’s exchange rates (1 March 2014) with currencies depreciated/appreciated by 1.0175 per annum for the baseline date of 1 January 2015.

I need to sound a note of caution in interpreting this graphic.  When projects are announced, the project price is also announced, and that’s the information I’ve used.  If the project is a small one, then it doesn’t matter much that the opening date for the project is different to the date at which the price is announced.  In some cases, however, the project will take a long time to complete, so it’s inconsistent to use the announced price for the project.  An example is Cerro Dominador, announced in February 2014 and not due to open until mid-2017.  The announced price is in 2014 dollars, whereas the datum on the graphic has been plotted as if the price is in deflated 2017 dollars.  So the results for Cerro Dominador look a bit better than they actually are.

Don’t allow these subtleties to obscure the overall trend, however, which is that solar power is obviously getting cheaper, both for solar thermal and for PV.


Wednesday, February 26, 2014

Cost of solar power (42)


Today I’ll run the numbers for a recently announced PV plant in La Paz, Mexico.  Stories on the plant are available here (RenewEconomy) and here (Thomson Reuters).

La Paz is the state capital of Baja California Sur and is situated on La Paz Bay at the southern end of the Baja California peninsula.  La Paz is said to be a beautiful town, with tourism playing a major part in the regional economy.

Thomson Reuters says La Paz “suffers from the pollution pumped out by the aging Punta Prieta thermoelectric plant, which uses some of the dirtiest petroleum products on earth: a mix of cheap, low-grade fuel oil and expensive high-sulfur diesel.” 

This is clearly a case that’s crying out for installation of clean solar energy. 

Thomson Reuters goes on to say that “Mexico’s energy ministry has set a target for 35 percent of the country’s energy output to come from clean sources by 2024.”  


(For international readers, I point out that Australia has a target for 41,000 TWh of its electricity generation to come from renewable sources by 2020.  When announced a few years back, it was equivalent to 20% of the national production; now with declining demand it will probably be about 25% of the national production in 2020.  It is widely believed that this target will be revised downwards in a current review by the federal government.)

Aura Solar I is Mexico’s first major installation and began operation in September 2013.  The peak output from the 100 Ha site will be 30 MW.  The project involves 132,000 solar panels from Suntech and has a total cost of USD 100 million.

So we know the cost and the peak output.  What about the annual production?  As is often the case, this figure is not readily available, so I’ll estimate it in two ways.

Thomson Reuters say the plant will involve CO2 emissions savings of 60,000 t per year.  At an emissions intensity of 0.9 t per MWhr, I make that 60,000/0.9 = 66,667 MWh per year. Alternatively we can estimate a reasonable capacity factor for fixed panels at this excellent site, say 22%, which gives annual output of 24 × 365 × 30 × 0.22 = 57,816 MWh per year.  As is usually the case, the two estimates don’t agree exactly, so I’ll use the nice round number of 60,000 MWh per year.

I’ll analyse the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) for the La Paz project using my standard assumptions:



  • there is no inflation,
  • taxation implications are neglected,  
  • projects are funded entirely by debt,  
  • all projects have the same interest rate (8%) and payback period (25 years), which means that the required rate of capital return is 9.4%,  
  • all projects have the same annual maintenance and operating costs (2% of the total project cost), and 
  • government subsidies are neglected.
For further commentary on my LCOE methodology, see posts on Real cost of coal-fired power, LEC – the accountant’s view, Cost of solar power (10) and (especially) Yet more on LEC.  Note that I am now using annual maintenance costs of 2% rather than 3% as in posts during 2011.

The results for La Paz are as follows:


Cost per peak Watt              USD 3.33/Wp
LCOE                                     USD 190/MWh


The components of the LCOE are:
Capital           {0.094 × USD 1 × 10^8 }/{60,000 MWhr} = USD 157/MWhr
O&M              {0.020 × USD 1 × 10^8 }/{60,000 MWhr} = USD 33/MWhr


By way of comparison, LCOE figures (in appropriate currency per MWh) for all projects I’ve investigated are given below.  The number in brackets is the reference to the blog post, all of which appear in my index of posts with the title “Cost of solar power ([number])”:


(2)        AUD 183 (Nyngan, Australia, PV)
(3)        EUR 503 (Olmedilla, Spain, PV, 2008)
(3)        EUR 188 (Andasol I, Spain, trough, 2009)
(4)        AUD 236 (Greenough, Australia, PV)
(5)        AUD 397 (Solar Oasis, Australia, dish, 2014?)
(6)        USD 163 (Lazio, Italy, PV)
(7)        AUD 271 (Kogan Creek, Australia, CLFR pre-heat, 2012?)
(8)        USD 228 (New Mexico, CdTe thin film PV, 2011)
(9)        EUR 200 (Ibersol, Spain, trough, 2011)
(10)      USD 231 (Ivanpah, California, tower, 2013?)
(11)      CAD 409 (Stardale, Canada, PV, 2012)
(12)      USD 290 (Blythe, California, trough, 2012?)
(13)      AUD 285 (Solar Dawn, Australia, CLFR, 2013?)
(14)      AUD 263 (Moree Solar Farm, Australia, single-axis PV, 2013?)
(15)      EUR 350 (Lieberose, Germany, thin-film PV, 2009)
(16)      EUR 300 (Gemasolar, Spain, tower, 2011)
(17)      EUR 228 (Meuro, Germany, crystalline PV, 2012)
(18)      USD 204 (Crescent Dunes, USA, tower, 2013)
(19)      AUD 316 (University of Queensland, fixed PV, 2011)
(20)      EUR 241 (Ait Baha, Morocco, 1-axis solar thermal, 2012)
(21)      EUR 227 (Shivajinagar Sakri, India, PV, 2012)
(22)      JPY 36,076 (Kagoshima, Kyushu, Japan, PV, start July 2012)
(23)      AUD 249 (NEXTDC, Port Melbourne, PV, Q2 2012)
(24)      USD 319 (Maryland Solar Farm, thin-film PV, Q4 2012)
(25)      EUR 207 (GERO Solarpark, Germany, PV, May 2012)
(26)      AUD 259 (Kamberra Winery, Australia, PV, June 2012)
(27)      EUR 105 (Calera y Chozas, PV, Q4 2012)
(28)      AUD 205 (Nyngan and Broken Hill, thin film PV, end 2014?)
(29)      AUD 342 (City of Sydney, multiple sites, PV, 2012)
(30)      AUD 281 (Uterne, PV, single-axis tracking, 2011)
(31)      JPY 31,448 (Oita, PV?, Japan, to open March 2014)
(32)      USD 342 (Shams, Abu Dhabi, trough, to open early 2013)
(34)      USD 272 (Daggett, California, designed 2010)
(35)      GBP 148 (Wymeswold, UK, PV, March 2013)
(36)      USD 139 (South Georgia, PV, June 2014)
(37)      USD 169 (Antelope Valley, CdTe Pv, end 2015)
(38)      AUD 137 (Mugga Lane, PV, mid 2014)
(39)      AUD 163 (Coree, fixed PV, Feb 2015)
(40)      AUD 298 (Ferngrove Winery, July 2013)
(41)      USD 125 (Cerro Dominador, mid 2017)
(42)      USD 190 (La Paz, PV, September 2013)





Conclusion

These LCOE numbers are good, but not the best in the world.  They are perhaps 5-10% higher than other recent big projects such as Antelope Valley (number 37) and Coree (number 39).

Over the weekend I’ll update my graphic that features all the above LCOE figures.